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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last thirty years, research in both law and political
science has adhered to a dominant discourse that looks like a
coherent set of notions about European constitutionalism and the role
of law in fostering the momentum for further European integration.1
Emblematic of this traditional view are Eric Stein, Joseph Weiler,
* Associate Professor, SIS Policy Scholar and Jean Monnet Chair Ad
Personam, American University.
1. See Loïc Azoulai & Renaud Dehousse, The European Court of Justice and
the Legal Dynamics of Integration, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION 350, 350–64 (Erik Jones et al. eds., 2012); J.H.H. WEILER, THE
CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: “DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?” AND
OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (1999); Joseph Weiler, The
Community System: the Dual Character of Supranationalism, in THE YEARBOOK
OF EUROPEAN LAW I 1981 267 (F.G. Jacobs ed., 1982); see also R. Daniel
Kelemen & Susan K. Schmidt, Introduction – The European Court of Justice and
Legal Integration: Perpetual Momentum?, 19 J. EUR. POL’Y 1, 2–5 (2012) (noting
that the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) has played an indispensible role as a
motor of European integration resulting in “pro-integration preferences”); cf.
Morten Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European Law: The
History of Legal Service of the European Executive, 1952–65, 21 CONTEMP. EUR.
HIST. 375, 376–83 (2012) [hereinafter Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional
Practice] (noting the very existence of the Court was debated in treaty negotiations
and depended on the cooperation of national courts to function).
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Renaud Dehousse, and Pierre Pescatore, whose work on legal
integration has shaped the field of EU studies.2 At the core of this
research is the question: How do we account for the expansion of
judicial power in the European Union? Much of this research
describes a constitutional narrative where legal decisions set the
European integration process on a clear trajectory, in which it shifted
from being an intergovernmental organization, transforming itself
into a federal system, and subsequently advocating for a more
democratic constitutional union. The so-called “judicial
empowerment” thesis provided the dominant theoretical and
empirical explanation for why the European Court of Justice through
its legal doctrines reconstituted the jurisdictional foundation of the
legal regime in Europe by expanding judicial power of courts at both
the national and European level through joint allocation of legal
authority to both levels.3 Through the seminal rulings, Van Gend en
Loos and Costa v. ENEL in 1963 and 1964 respectively, the Court
established direct effect and supremacy as core principles on which
to build the subsequent case law over the next five decades.4
National courts acquiesced to this constitutional practice, referring
thousands of cases to the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) for
preliminary rulings concerning a wide range of socio-economic
disputes. This well-known legal analysis describes an evolutionary
development that seems natural and inevitable as the subsequent
rationale for deepening integration through law rests on a functional
premise, framed in terms of efficiency gains, in which the extension
of the market, promotion of economic freedoms, and rise of
2. RENAUD DEHOUSSE, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL INTEGRATION 71 (1998); Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of
a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1981); J.H.H. Weiler, The
Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2406 (1991); PIERRE PESCATORE,
THE LAW OF INTEGRATION: EMERGENCE OF A NEW PHENOMENON IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 44–52 (1974).
3. Weiler, supra note 2.
4. See, e.g., Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 587 (“A Member
State’s obligation under the EEC Treaty . . . is legally complete and consequently
capable of producing direct effects on the relations between Member States and
individuals.”); Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der
Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 8 (holding that Article 12 of the EEC Treaty
“produces direct effects and creates individual rights which national courts must
protect”).
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regulatory agencies require legal doctrines that provide solutions to
the growing complexity of “shared rule.”5
However, the contraction of the European economy due to the
sovereign debt crisis has raised concerns about both the effectiveness
of the European Union and its constituent Member States and the
institutional and administrative capacity of the political system to
deal with the crisis. In the current context, European
constitutionalism has become seemingly disengaged from the major
debates about growth, prosperity, and competitiveness. While for
some the locus of power has shifted away from Member States to
central banks or international financial institutions, in terms of
promoting macro-economic stability, the jural state is as central to
the history of European economic integration as it is central to the
history of American political development.6
In contemporary European history, courts also operate in the
context of social and economic change and political volatility. The
economic recession and ensuing euro crisis in Europe has generated
pressure on domestic wages and prices through cuts to public
spending aimed at reducing a state’s debts and deficits and increasing
the overall economic competitiveness and investment climate.
However, judicial intervention has played a critical role in reviewing
the bailouts, the so-called fiscal compact and its constitutionality, in
several Member States. In Germany, petitions challenged the lack of
parliamentary involvement in the passage of the “bailout” treaties.
The German Constitutional Court ruled that the resulting European
stabilization mechanism conforms to German budgetary
5. See generally DAVID MCKAY, DESIGNING EUROPE: COMPARATIVE
LESSONS FROM THE FEDERAL EXPERIENCE (2001); THE FEDERAL VISION:
LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
EUROPEAN UNION (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001) [hereinafter
THE FEDERAL VISION]
6. See generally MICHELLE P. EGAN, CONSTRUCTING A EUROPEAN MARKET:
STANDARDS, REGULATION, AND GOVERNANCE (2001) [hereinafter EGAN,
CONSTRUCTING A EUROPEAN MARKET] (outlining the importance of the “jural
state” to integration); MICHELLE P. EGAN, SINGLE MARKETS: ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (forthcoming) [hereinafter
EGAN, SINGLE MARKETS]. The term “jural state” is taken from William J. Novak,
The Legal Origins of the Modern American State, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S
CENTURY 249, 252 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter Novak, The Legal
Origins of the Modern American State]. The work of William Novak and Howard
Gillman has been influential in terms of shaping arguments in this essay.
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sovereignty.7 By comparison, the Portuguese Constitutional Court
ruled that specific austerity measures passed by the legislature
breached the Constitution, as they discriminated between public and
private workers.8 Courts at the national level can therefore provide a
level of uncertainty to European Union efforts to address the
eurozone debt crisis. At the same time, the current protectionist
pressures and renationalization of economic policies face similar
scrutiny from the ECJ to ensure that economic freedoms and
competitive market practices are not undermined.9 In this sense, the
courts play a continuing role in addressing the functional deficiencies
of a common currency framework as well as fostering and
maintaining a single market. The scope and interpretation of
European law is central to the functioning of the European economy;
furthermore, the federal preemption of state laws and regulations to
create that integrated economy has generated new issues for both
state and federal courts seeking to balance both public power and
private rights.10 The ECJ has derived its authority from multiple
constitutional sources—both national and international—in
expanding its legal framework and jurisprudence.11 Even then, the
7. See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional
Court] July 10, 2012, [BVerwGE] 17–19, (Ger.) (discussing the implications of
global market stabilization on German budgetary sovereignty); see also Kenneth
A. Armstrong, Pringle Has His Chips, EUTOPIA LAW, eutopialaw.com/2012/11/
27/pringle-has-his-chips/ (Nov. 27, 2012) (explaining the Court’s stance that any
unilateral state action must be consistent and compatible with obligations under
EU law, specifically in the context of the validity of the European Council
Decision and the “alleged incompatibility between the ESM Treaty and EU law”).
8. See Acórdão do Tribunal Constitucional n.º 187/2013, Diário da República,
1.ª série — N.º 78 — 22 de abril de 2013, available at http://dre.pt/pdf1sdip/2013/
04/07800/0232802423.pdf.
9. See Hugo Brady, The Politics of European Justice, CTR. EUR. REFORM
(June 1, 2011), www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/bulletin-article/2011/politicseuropean-justice (considering the ECJ’s move into “areas that affect national
sovereignty and personal freedoms” to be “controversial”).
10. See generally MIGUEL POIARES MADURO, WE THE COURT: THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL
READING OF ARTICLE 30 OF THE EC TREATY (1998) [hereinafter MADURO, WE THE
COURT] (discussing how the balance of power between the Member States and the
Union, and between public power and the market, has created powerful
constitutional dilemmas in promoting market integration).
11. See J.H.H. Weiler & Nicolas J.S. Lockhart, Taking Rights Seriously: The
European Court and its Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence Part I, 32 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 51, 52–53 (1995) [hereinafter Weiler & Lockhart, Taking Rights
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acceptance of European law has not been unconditional, for it has
been resisted by national constitutional courts.12 Some scholars argue
that Member States have, in some instances, challenged this
incursion upon domestically entrenched rights and legislative statutes
and their refusal to accept the primacy of European law reflects a
long-held concern about rights protection within the Community
framework.13 Others see the European legal order as based on
competing claims of authority, with the resulting legal pluralism
leading to a system where constitutional claims are continuously
accommodated given the multiplicity of constitutional jurisdictions.14
Few dispute the central role of the Court in the integration process.
As state actors failed to slow down the surge of trade barriers and
protectionism, the Court was consequential in shaping markets and
fostering agreement on common policies in the early decades. Not
only did the Court generate innovative rules and norms—such as
Seriously] (suggesting that protection of human rights serves as a grounds for
jurisdiction); see also Miguel Poiares Maduro, Interpreting European Law:
Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional Pluralism, 1 EUR. J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 14 [hereinafter Maduro, Interpreting European Law] (noting as an
example that “the authority which the Court itself recognizes to its previous
decisions is a consequence of the need to guarantee the values of coherence,
uniformity and legal certainty inherent to any legal system”).
12. See generally KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF
EUROPEAN LAW: THE MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE
60–71 (2001) [hereinafter ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN
LAW]; BILL DAVIES, RESISTING THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: WEST
GERMANY’S CONFRONTATION WITH EUROPEAN LAW, 1949-1979 7–19 (2012).
13. THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS—DOCTRINE AND
JURISPRUDENCE: LEGAL CHANGE IN ITS SOCIAL CONTEXT (Anne-Marie Slaughter
et al. eds., 1998); see Verwaltungsgericht [VG] [Administrative Trial Courts] Dec.
17, 1970, [BVerwGE] (Ger.) (“Although Community regulations are not German
national laws, but legal rules pertaining to the community, they must respect the
elementary, fundamental rights guaranteed by the German Constitution and the
essential structural principles of national law.”); KAREN J. ALTER, THE EUROPEAN
COURT’S POLITICAL POWER: SELECTED ESSAYS (2009).
14. See J.H.H. Weiler, Federalism Without Constitutionalism: Europe’s
Sonderweg, in THE FEDERAL VISION, supra note 5, at 55, 58–59; see also Daniel
Halberstam, Pluralism in Marbury and Van Gend, THE PAST AND FUTURE OF EU
LAW: THE CLASSICS OF EU LAW REVISITED ON THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
ROME TREATY 30–32 (Miguel Poiares Maduro & Loïc Azoulai eds., 2010)
(comparing pluralism in the United States and Europe by juxtaposing limits on the
Supreme Court’s power of judicial review with the scope of supremacy and
Community law over national law and the scope of rights that European law
affords individuals within Member States).
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mutual recognition—to foster market integration by accepting
regulatory equivalence among states, the courts have been charged
with monitoring and enforcing market regulations to ensure
compliance.15 Legal historians have fostered a lively debate about the
reliability and accuracy of these dominant interpretations that have
emerged to explain the constitutional foundations of the European
Community.16 While there were initial concerns about a gouvernment
de juges, resulting in conditional controls over the European Court,17
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Court kept its focus on
procedural questions. While the ECJ was designed to establish
regularity in court procedure, it did not take a proactive role
addressing treaty violations or pushing the common market
forward.18 Initially, the ECJ drew upon the terms outlined in the
Treaty of Rome and Treaty of Paris to create a court that could a)
establish a standard interpretation of EU laws; b) annul legal
proceedings contrary to Community goals; c) assess breaches of
Community obligations; d) penalize European institutions for failure
to act; and e) provide advisory opinions.19 However, the Court has
sought to use the conferred powers through the preliminary rulings
mechanism in which domestic courts could seek an interpretation of
the application of European law in the domestic context (article 267
TFEU) into a more systematic mechanism for promoting the uniform
application of EU law.20
While some of this earlier scholarship generated a seminal

15. EGAN, SINGLE MARKETS, supra note 6.
16. Antoine Vauchez, ‘Integration-through-Law’ Contribution to a Sociohistory of EU Political Commonsense 2–3 (European Univ. Inst. Robert Schuman
Ctr. for Advanced Studies, EUI Working Papers RSCAS 2008/10, 2010), available
at www.eui.eu/RSCAS/WP-Texts/08_10.pdf; see also Rasmussen, Establishing a
Constitutional Practice, supra note 1, at 378.
17. ROBERT LECOURT, L’EUROPE DES JUGES (1976); Morten Rasmussen,
Exploring the Secret History of the Legal Service of the European Executives,
1952-1967 10 (EUSA Conference, Mar. 2011), available at http://euce.org/eusa/
2011/papers/5d_rasmussen.pdf.
18. See Karen J. Alter, The Global Spread of European Style International
Courts, 35 W. EUR. POL. 135, 140 (2012) [hereinafter Alter, The Global Spread].
19. See Azoulai & Dehousse, supra note 1, at 357–59; Anne Boerger-de
Smedt, La Court de Justice dans les Négociations du Traité de Paris Institutant la
CECA 1 (2011), available at euce.org/eusa/2011/papers/5d_boerger.pdf.
20. Note that the United States Supreme Court requires an actual case or
controversy to grant certiorari and does not provide an advisory review function.
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“integration through law project,”21 proponents of a new legal history
have called for a more finely grained analysis of the historical
evolution of European law, and in doing so, call on us to reconsider
the canonical histories that have triggered a more normative
approach in which there has been a shift from legal reasoning and
analysis to broader questions about the role of courts in a democratic
society.22 Some critics perceive this teleological interpretation as
judicial activism,23 since the shift from interpretation of the legal
rules to a broader “constitutional telos” implies a different
conception of courts than those that rely on text such as
constructivism or originalism24 Other critics perceive the
constitutional asymmetry inherent in EU treaties and case law as
undermining the social model in the face of market integration.25 In
21. See generally Mauro Cappelletti, Integration Through Law: Europe and the
American Federal Experience—A General Introduction, in INTEGRATION
THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE 3 (Vol. 1:
Methods, Tools, and Institutions, Book 1: A Political, Legal, and Economic
Overview) (1986).
22. Compare id. (emphasizing the early view that the role of law was crucial to
effective integration), with Robert A. Dahl, Decision Making in a Democracy: The
Supreme Court as a National Policy‐Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 281–83 (1957)
(drawing on his seminal arguments in the Preface to Democratic Theory in relation
to the role of courts in a democratic society as not simply institutions to protect
minority rights against majority tyranny, but frequently called upon to select
among alternative policies in which there is contestation and disagreement, so that
the court must “choose among controversial alternatives of public policy by
appealing to at least some criteria of acceptability on questions of fact and value
that cannot be found in or deduced from precedent, statute, and Constitution”). See
Giandomenico Majone, Europe’s Democratic Deficit: The Question of Standards,
4 EUR. L.J. 5, 11 (1998) for a similar application about non-majoritarian
institutions in the EU context.
23. See HJALTE RASMUSSEN, ON LAW AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING 377 (1986).
24. Maduro, Interpreting European Law, supra note 11, at 7–8. See generally
ANTONIN SCALIA, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 3 (Amy
Cutmann ed., 1997) (arguing that an originalist perspective is appropriate when
interpreting the United States Constitution).
25. See Jonathon W. Moses, Is Constitutional Symmetry Enough? Social
Models and Markey Integration in the US and Europe, 49 J. COM. MKT. STUD.
823, 824–26 (2011); see also Michelle Egan, Single Market, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 1, at 410–11 (“[T]he economic
constitution of the EU not only promotes cross-border liberalization, contingent on
specific judicial exemptions, but also provides for the possibility of addressing
market failure through the establishment of rules in the common interest.”); Fritz
W. Scharpf, The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity,
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this view, national welfare and employment policies are subject to
scrutiny and may be incompatible with economic integration.26 For
Giandomenico Majone, the European Union cannot pursue the same
type of distributional politics that characterize national welfare states
due to its lack of legitimacy and efficiency.27 By contrast, advocates
perceive the expansion of EU social rights, addressing the rights of
individuals, not only in terms of “market citizenship” through
employment rights, working conditions, and pay equity, but also
through new social rights for third country nationals through family
reunification, social protection, and assistance schemes,28 as critical
for socio-economic legitimacy.29

II. NEW APPROACHES TO EU LAW
Are such approaches correct and desirable in understanding the
development of the European legal order? In his analysis, Hjalte
Rasmussen argues that scholars have not looked critically enough at
the “constitutional” paradigm and its subsequent adoption almost
wholesale into academic, political, and judicial circles.30 It has
become the dominant narrative that few scholars challenge the
transformation of the treaties into a constitutional polity. Regardless

40 J. COM. MKT. STUD. 645, 649–50 (2002).
26. Scharpf, supra note 25, at 645. See generally Case C-346/06, Rüffert v
Niedersachsen, 2008 E.C.R. I-01989, 01994; Case C-438/05, Int’l Transp.
Workers’ Fed’n et al. v. Viking Line ABP et al., 2007 E.C.R. I-10806, 10835; Case
C-341/05, Luval un Patneri v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet et al., 2007
E.C.R. I-11845, 11888. These cases focus on the relationship between market
freedoms and fundamental social rights, with a particular focus on the freedom of
association, the right to collective bargaining, and the right to strike.
27. Majone, supra note 22, at 15 (explaining that the development of welfare
policies at the European level would actually aggravate the legitimacy problem).
28. See Lisa Conant, When Courts Decide: Foreigners’ Rights and Social
Citizenship in Europe and the US, 7 EUR. POL. SCI. 43, 44–45 (2008) (comparing
Europe to the United States in a discussion of new social rights recognized in
European courts).
29. See MARIO MONTI, A NEW STRATEGY FOR THE SINGLE MARKET: AT THE
SERVICE OF EUROPE’S ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 23–24, 71 (2010), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/monti_report_final_10_05_2010_en.pdf (observing a
certain “integration fatigue” as well as a “market fatigue,” suggesting there is a
need to restore a much-needed legitimacy to the single market to promote both
economic growth and social rights).
30. See Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice, supra note 1, at
381.
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of whether this emerged from instrumental, conscious judicial
actions on the part of legal activists or through incremental, cautious
expansion of legal competences through the doctrines of direct
effect, supremacy, and the liberalized criteria for standing to sue, the
European Court has paralleled many of the moves made by federal
constitutional courts.
In recent years, new archival work by legal historians has
emphasized the importance of the historical and institutional context
for understanding the evolution of EU integration, as one that
involves a multitude of actors—from lawyers and judges to elected
officials—who were pursuing independent and often strategic goals
coalescing around an agenda that enabled court-centered activism.31
First, this was a period when the legal community was expanding its
own professional identity. Lawyers became key advocates in the
debates, and successfully mobilized a transnational network of jurists
through the legal service and national federations of European law.32
Second, elected officials provided the opportunity to expand the
venue for legal jurisdiction by including provisions for amending
constitutions to allow for the prospect of a supranational legal
framework, that has subsequently expanded the options for litigation,
and providing for remedies, including sanctions and financial
penalties, to enlarge the ambit of judicial power. Third, the scope of
litigation interacted with the opportunities provided by other
institutions. Litigation rates were not high initially, arguably due to
the predominance of politically driven integration through strategies
of harmonization and approximation.33 Once recalcitrant States
blocked further political integration, fearing threats to state
hegemony, the strategic game shifted to the legal arena. A
constitutional entrenchment of rights through the supremacy and
31. See Morten Rasmussen, Constructing and Deconstructing ‘Constitutional’
European Law: Some Reflections on how to Study the History of European Law 2–
3, 12 (EUSA Conference, 2011) [hereinafter Rasmussen, Constructing and
Deconstructing], available at euce.org/eusa/2011/papers/6a_rasmussen.pdf. See
generally TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION: GOVERNING
EUROPE 1945–83 (Wolfram Kaiser et al. eds., 2010).
32. Rasmussen, Constructing and Deconstructing, supra note 31, at 15. See
generally ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW, supra note
12; Karen Alter, Jurist Social Movements in Europe, 20 EUSA REV. (Fall 2007),
available at http://www.eustudies.org/publications_review_fall07.php.
33. EGAN, CONSTRUCTING A EUROPEAN MARKET, supra note 6, at 106.
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direct-effect doctrines resulted in institutional empowerment to foster
credible commitments, reduce decision-making costs, and prevent
policy reversals.34
These analyses over time opened up new lines of inquiry into the
role of legal pluralism, in terms of how the role of preliminary
rulings shape the incentives and constraints facing lower courts,35 the
strategies of litigation and legal mobilization,36 and the diffusion of
legal norms beyond the European context.37 Fascination with the
origins of the constitutional paradigm has given way to more formal
analysis looking at the relationship between the courts, the degree of
autonomy or constraints imposed by state signaling,38 and more
comparative work on constitutional review and administrative rulemaking, which provides a plurality of approaches from principalagent to deliberative democracy models.39 Though these models hold
34. See Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to
Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the US, 1875-1891, 96 AMER. POL.
SCI. REV. 511, 511 (2002) (“Studies have attributed institutional empowerment to a
variety of political motivations including a desire to protect . . . favored policies
against reversal.”); Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutional Courts, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 818–820 (Michel Rosenfeld
& András Sajó eds., 2012) (discussing the emphasis on rights in the new
constitutionalism).
35. See Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A
Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 INT’L ORG. 41, 62–64 (1993) (describing
the intra-judicial dialogue between the ECJ and national judges, which following
neo-functionalist analysis enabled them to empower one another). See generally
ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW, supra note 12.
36. LISA CONANT, JUSTICE CONTAINED: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION (2002); RACHEL A. CICHOWSKI, THE EUROPEAN COURT AND CIVIL
SOCIETY: LITIGATION, MOBILIZATION AND GOVERNANCE (2007).
37. Alter, The Global Spread, supra note 18, at 140; see Karen J. Alter &
Laurence R. Helfer, Nature or Nurture? Judicial Lawmaking in the European
Court of Justice and the Andean Tribunal of Justice, 64 INT. ORG. 563, 565 (2010).
38. See Geoffrey Garrett et al., The European Court of Justice, National
Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union, 52 INT. ORG. 149,
150, 156–57 (1998) (attributing to the ECJ an important but constrained role in
enforcing contracts and engaging in dispute resolution).
39. See Christian Hunold, Corporatism, Pluralism, and Democracy: Toward a
Deliberative Theory of Bureaucratic Accountability, 14 GOVERNANCE 151, 152–54
(2001); Francesca Bignami, From Expert Administration to Accountability
Network: A New Paradigm for Comparative Administrative Law, 59 AM. J. COMP.
L. 859, 861 (2001) (proposing an administrative law model that puts accountability
at the heart of the network). See generally MARK A. POLLACK, THE ENGINES OF
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: DELEGATION, AGENCY, AND AGENDA SETTING IN THE
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much promise, the focus on institutional rules and design or
attitudinal values to explain legal outcomes has been much more
prominent in the U.S. context than in the European context.40 While
such institutional settings provide bargaining situations in which we
can understand how majorities are constructed or whether specific
cases are accepted or declined, there has been little work on the role
of judicial preferences in the European context. Consequently there
has been limited research on opinion assignment, circulation of
opinion drafts, bargaining among justices regarding opinion
language, and so forth, to see how such legal procedures and norms
impact outcomes. Rasmussen’s challenge has broader implications in
that studies of the ECJ have not focused on the issue of appointments
and nominations, which receive far less scrutiny given the range of
issues that come before the Court’s purview. In addition, both formal
procedural Chamber rules and informal Court practices matter more
in crafting the law than scholarship has documented, since the degree
to which judges concede on an opinion, strategically control the
breadth of the judgment, or defer to present state of law or legally
relevant factors, deserves greater attention.41
In this special issue, Rasmussen offers a new historical
understanding of EU law that calls for a more sociological approach
to European law, and a more synthetic, integrative history that
includes greater attention to legal history to understand the
historiography of European integration.42 But such a history may
benefit from moving beyond its single-case focus to think
EU 323 (2003) (noting that delegation can be a sign of credible commitment, may
prevent policy reversals, and may reduce transaction costs, thereby increasing its
economic utility).
40. See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 19, 20–23 (1993) (examining the separation
of powers model in the United States to support the notion that such delegation and
deliberative models are more effective in the United States than in Europe).
41. See generally Forrest Maltzman, James F. Spriggs II, & Paul J. Wahlbeck,
Strategy and Judicial Choice: New Institutionalist Approaches to Supreme Court
Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONAL
APPROACHES (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999); POLLACK,
supra note 39.
42. See Morten Rasmussen, Rewriting the History of European Public Law:
The New Contribution of Historians, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1187 (2013). For a
general overview, see Bill Davies & Morten Rasmussen, Towards a New History
of European Law, 21 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 305 (2012).
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comparatively in a wider sense about legal method and history.
Unsurprisingly given their methodological orientation, legal
historians drawing on sociological approaches have also raised
important questions about networks, culture, perceptions, rhetoric,
and the connections between state and civil society.43 Like legal
realists in the United States, however, many of the pioneers of legal
integration in Europe are not simply documenting the emergence and
development of legal doctrines; they view law in context, not as an
autonomous legal order (despite the language of Van Gend en Loos),
but as part of the administrative, regulatory, and judicial realm.44
They are interested in broader patterns of legal action and inaction
that come from the decisions of administrative agencies as well as
judge-made law.45 Without neglecting the central role of the judiciary
in shaping European governance, such legal scholarship has also
focused on the growth of administrative governance in which the
diffusion of power to the supranational level generated concerns
about democratic legitimacy due to the delegation of power to nonmajoritarian institutions whether public or private.46 These scholars
are raising important substantive and procedural questions about
constitutional practices where majoritarian principles may be
undermined by judicial or administrative review.47 By raising
43. See, e.g., Davies & Rasmussen, supra note 42.
44. Andreas Grimmel, Integration and the Context of Law: Why the European
Court of Justice is not a Political Actor, 3 LES CAHIERS EUROPÉNS DE SCIENCES
PO, at 6, 21 (2011) (shifting the emphasis from an expansive framework of law
that focuses on actors and interests toward the social context of
reasoning and action and to view law as “an independent context of reasoning and
action”).
45. Bignami, supra note 39, at 898 (describing administrative law in the United
States, Australia, and Britain).
46. See Peter Lindseth, Delegation is Dead, Long Live Delegation: Managing
the Democratic Disconnect in the European Market-Polity, in GOOD GOVERNANCE
IN EUROPE’S INTEGRATED MARKET 139, 141–43 (Christian Joerges & Renaud
Dehousse eds., 2002) (finding weakness in new conceptions of democratic and
constitutional legitimacy through deliberative democracy and non-hierarchical
institutions because they fail to account for the continued hierarchical modes of
governance associated with nation states that are still viewed as reflecting the
demos).
47. See Annabelle Lever, Democracy and Judicial Review: Are They Really
Incompatible?, 7 PERSP. POL. 804, 806–12 (2009) (assessing the compatibility of
majoritarian principles and judicial review, and noting that despite many critics’
opinions supposing judicial review undermines democratic representation, judges
do not serve a counter-majoritarian role).
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normative implications about delegation in European governance, it
reminds us that we also need to understand both the constitutional
and statutory nature of issues under judicial purview, as the role of
the court may differ from that of administrative rule-making
depending on the issue area and policy domain.
Certainly specialized legal histories are important—as are specific
policy studies—to enhance our understanding of European
integration, but they need to embrace bigger causal questions of
theoretical and historical interest such as the relationship of law to
contemporary democracy, the rights and conceptions of citizenship,
the relationship of law to market capitalism, and the issues of
internationalism, sovereignty, and legal pluralism—all of which have
been at the forefront in recent high profile legal judgments such as
Zambrano, Ruffert, Viking, Laval, and Kadi.48 The consequences of
past actions and political choices in the European legal context are
monumental for the present as European law has been instrumental
in both the simultaneous creation of new powers and competences
and the constitutionalization of new individual rights.49
European law has “contained” the centrifugal forces in European
societies and polities by overcoming the fragmentation of multiple
local jurisdictions and integrating them into a system that enlarges its
field of economic scrutiny into social welfare activity by regulating
private power in the public interest, privileging and providing
selective benefits to citizens and workers, and allowing private
interests to provide public functions.50 Through, for example, the
creation of a strong competition regime, the expansion of nondiscrimination provisions for pension portability and equal pay, and
the delegation of standard setting to private bodies, legal rules have
shaped market competition. In the context of this larger
transformation of governance, the contentious politics over the status
and primacy of law in a federal context is neither unique nor specific
to Europe. Making a comparative assessment of the relationship
48. See Stephen Weatherill, The Constitutional Context of (Ever-Wider)
Policy-Making, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 570, 571–
73 (describing the widening scope of European law).
49. Andrew Moravcsik & Andrea Sangiovanni, On Democracy and “Public
Interest” in the European Union, available at http://www.princeton.edu/
~amoravcs/library/scharpf.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
50. Id.
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between legal supremacy and federalism using studies in U.S. legal
history may shed light on the interactions between the central and
constituent legal units that provide ways of re-imagining European
legal integration. In particular, the development of legal jurisdiction,
the contestation surrounding federal court supremacy and subsequent
legal reforms, and the issue of social rights and market citizenship in
the United States provide important reference points for studies of
European legal developments. The field of American political
development (“APD”) can provide a fertile environment for scholars
interested in the study of legal institutional change.

III. THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT IN
FEDERAL COURTS
A quarter-century ago, Stephen Skowronek, in his seminal work,
recognized the indispensability of a “state of courts” to contain the
centrifugal forces in American politics.51 Within the historiography
of American political development there are different
characterizations of the role of law in shaping the American polity.52
The judicial role in American governance is worth considering, given
its promotion and constraint of commercial interests, civil and
political rights and the propriety of this constitutional independence
that has often led to constitutionally contentious boundaries between
federal and state jurisdictions. Just like its European counterpart, the
Supreme Court has become the constitutional interpreter, but just as
importantly, it has been contested by different groups, from
segregationists to pro-life groups.53
In the United States, the Supreme Court does not merely solve
disputes between contesting litigants, it authoritatively interprets and
51. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE
EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920 39 (1982).
52. Id. See generally Novak, The Legal Origins of the Modern American State,
supra note 6, at 252 (highlighting different interpretations of the constitutive role
of law in constituting social regulations, ordered market relations, and public
welfare); SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST
APPROACHES (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) [hereinafter
SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING].
53. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY 4 (2007) (elaborating on the role of the Supreme Court in terms of
constitutional construction and interpretation in relation to broader political
regimes, the politics of constitutional authority, and how it plays out over time).
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develops constitutional reasoning. This constitutional interpretation
has to be accepted by other political actors, which is often the source
of contention against expansive judicial reasoning. At times, there
has been deference to judicial authority, and in other instances, state
officials, presidents, and federal executives have challenged the
Court’s purview.54 In the United States, judicial empowerment has
generated different interpretations, with legal historians focusing on
judicial power as a product of legal action derived from judges’ own
independent choices.55 Whereas political scientists have viewed
judicial empowerment as contingent on the efforts of legislative and
executive institutions to fashion a judiciary that serves particular
partisan interests56 or provides stability and security of outcomes
under situations of institutional instability and gridlock.57
However, like the constitutional narrative in the European Union,
the standard story in the United States is also problematic. The
attention given to Marbury v. Madison in 1803, where Chief Justice
John Marshall established the power of judicial review, is misleading
since the power of judicial review evolved over the course of the
nineteenth century.58 Although there were sixty cases between 1789
and 1861 in which the Court evaluated the constitutionality of a
federal statute, the Court was “laying the foundations for that
practice and establishing its role as a forum for testing the limits of
congressional powers.”59 Parties often raised challenges to the
application of federal law, particularly in the federal district courts
and circuit courts where cases were often highly controversial,
touching on slavery, taxation, and bankruptcy provisions.60
54. Leslie Friedman Goldstein, State Resistance to Authority in Federal
Unions: The Early United States (1790–1860) and the European Community
(1958–94), 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 149, 157–59 (1997) [hereinafter Goldstein,
State Resistance].
55. See Gillman, supra note 34, at 512.
56. See id. (offering support for the view that judicial empowerment is meant
to serve certain partisan interests).
57. Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundation of Democracy and the Rule of
Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245, 246 (1997).
58. Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Review of Congress Before the Civil War, 97
GEO. L.J. 1257, 1285–86 (2009) [hereinafter Whittington, Judicial Review].
59. Id. at 1267.
60. See LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, CONSTITUTING FEDERAL SOVEREIGNTY:
THE EUROPEAN UNION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 54–55 (2001) [hereinafter
GOLDSTEIN, CONSTITUTING FEDERAL SOVEREIGNTY] (demonstrating state
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The federal courts were regularly called upon to consider the
legitimate scope of congressional authority and exercise their judicial
authority to review the validity of legislative and executive action.
But the Supreme Court largely built its power of judicial review in
the early decades against recalcitrant states as it struck down many
local and state policies, and imposed few restrictions on the national
government until after the Civil War.61 The independence of state
and local government had been the source of tension, so the judiciary
was conceived as a means of preserving peace and fostering unity as
part of a “power constraint” system.62 In an effort to undercut localist
tendencies, the Marshall Court sought to vest lower courts with
federal authority, empowering the Court’s jurisdiction in the
aftermath of the repeal of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1801 when its
legislative grant of federal jurisdiction was curtailed.63 The goal of
Marshall and others was to use these “local” federal courts to apply
“the supreme law of the land” uniformly throughout the localities.64
Just like the new legal history in Europe, the federal courts were
embedded in a complex, multi-level system that enhanced the
jurisdiction of the federal courts through delegation and the right to
review state laws, both of which were key issues in early debates on
U.S. federalism.65
But such judicial empowerment was not inevitable. In nineteenth
century America, federal district courts, according to Howard
Gillman, had remarkably limited jurisdiction.66 Hostilities towards
federal judicial power were not uncommon. Most federal issues were
resistance to federal authority, including the formative early years of the American
state); Goldstein, State Resistance, supra note 54, at 157–63.
61. See Gillman, supra note 34, at 516; Keith E. Whittington, “Interpose Your
Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the
United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583, 586 (2005);
Whittington, Judicial Review, supra note 58, at 1308–10.
62. See Daniel H. Deudney, The Philadelphian System: Sovereignty, Arms
Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-Union Circa 1787-1861, 42
INT. ORG. 191, 202–03 (1995) (explaining that, far from producing anarchy, the
Philadelphia system was built on union and the mediation of interests, in contrast
to the European balance-of-powers system).
63. Alison L. LaCroix, Federalists, Federalism, and Federal Jurisdiction, 30
LAW & HIST. REV. 205, 210 (2012).
64. Id. at 211.
65. Id. at 211–12.
66. Gillman, supra note 34, at 513.
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heard in state courts where there was often resistance to the higher
court in the first several decades over a range of issues.67 The
Supreme Court also faced strong sectional interests, and was unable
to leverage its role in shaping federal policies, as vested interests
sharply curtailed its competences.68 Efforts to enhance the federal
judiciary were rejected until after the Civil War. Federal judicial
districts and circuits were tied to state boundaries, no circuit
contained both a free and a slave state to ensure the protection of
Southern regional interests, and while riding circuit, federal judges
were required to include the local federal judge who made the
original decision in the subsequent appeals process.69 For Gillman,
local and regional considerations remained paramount, thus
preventing the creation of a national judiciary.70
The creation of a more effective national judicial system owed
much to the pressure from Northern financial and commercial
interests that sought to improve the efficiency of the federal
judiciary.71 While there were some calls from judges, lawyers, and
newspapers to increase the number of district courts and eliminate
circuit riding by justices, the subsequent legislative reforms
expanded the federal role of courts, redirected civil litigation
involving national commercial interests out of state courts, and
resulted in a more active role for federal courts in confronting the
new corporate and financial practices.72 The result was a federal
judiciary that invoked the Commerce Clause with unprecedented
frequency and interpreted it to require courts to eliminate barriers to
the free flow of interstate goods and services. However, such
involvement generated a significant increase in case load, with rising

67. See GOLDSTEIN, CONSTITUTING FEDERAL SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 60, at
64; see also Goldstein, State Resistance, supra note 54, at 157–59.
68. See RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1877-1900 518 (2000) (expounding on the judicial
construction of a national market).
69. Gillman, supra note 34, at 514.
70. See id. at 516 (quoting Keller (citation omitted)) (“Public life in the years
immediately after the Civil War was dominated by the conflict between the
impulse to foster an active state and a broader national citizenship on the one hand,
and deeply rooted countervalues of localism, racism and suspicion of government
on the other . . . .”).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 515.
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rates of litigation on the appellate, circuit, and district dockets.73
The subsequent restructuring of the federal judiciary through
Congressional action in the 1870s was not uncontested. Partisan
politics played a significant role in judicial empowerment as
prevailing debates between Republican and Democratic politics over
economic regulation shaped jurisdiction and constitutional
practices.74 The federal context provided the opportunity for the
Supreme Court to promote national supremacy, resolve interstate
disputes and contribute to the process of state building through
striking down legislative barriers that undermined the consolidation
of the national market.75 However, the result was to remove
localizing pressures and expand the powers and responsibilities of
the federal judiciary as part of a broader enhancement of federal
capacity and administration in the late nineteenth century. The rise of
the jural state76 corresponded with the rise of the administrative
regulatory state in the United States as the need for greater
administrative capacity to deal with the growth of large-scale
enterprises and new commercial and financial practices generated
new responsibilities for non-majoritarian institutions.77 Under the
guise of jurisdictional and procedural reforms, as part of a larger
process of delegated powers to public agencies dealing with issues
arising from industrialism, the political construction of judicial
power advanced throughout the nineteenth century.
As major economic transformations took place in the United
States, the corresponding social changes also fostered important legal
73. Id. at 519–20.
74. See BENSEL, supra note 68, at 502–03 (highlighting examples of the deeply
partisan debates in 1890 over the McKinley Tariff Act and the Sherman Silver
Purchase Act).
75. See id. at 516–17 (“[W]hile rhetorically acknowledging the possible need
for restraints on market expansion, the Republicans turned most of the
implementation of laissez-fair principles over to Republican judges on the
Supreme Court who, well insulated from popular influence, could turn back state
and local attempts to Balkanize the national market.”); accord Gillman, supra note
34, at 519 (“[T]he overall record demonstrates that conservative Supreme Court
justices were quite willing to support Congress’s efforts to expand the control of
federal courts over commercial litigation.”) .
76. William J. Novak, The Myth of the “Weak” American State, 113 AM. HIST.
REV. 767 (2008) [hereinafter Novak, Myth of the “Weak” American State].
77. See generally Novak, The Legal Origins of the Modern American State,
supra note 6, at 249–83.
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debates about the scope of citizenship, individual rights and political
inclusion, and the role of the state in regulating social and economic
life.78 While courts grappled with issues of public goods and private
rights from the early days of the republic, the predominant view was
to characterize the American law “[a]s something of a conservative
roadblock to liberal reform—part of a reactionary and exceptional
American juridical tradition that continually frustrates the
development of a proper American welfare state” and restricts its
“[c]ommitment to civil rights.”79 This narrative misses the substantial
role of the police powers that, in the nineteenth century,
encompassed a range of social policies that provided for “the
people’s welfare.”80 The broad legal definition of police power was
upheld by the Supreme Court, which invalidated state laws when
they were related to class legislation, providing preferential treatment
to specific groups. However, states and localities enacted thousands
of public laws protecting welfare, securing social order, and
employing regulatory powers of government.81 The new legal history
of American private law, according to William Novak, challenges
the dominant narrative of law as a protector of private liberty,
property rights, and a “jurisprudential commitment” to private rights
over public goods.82 The resulting “new social legislation” or
“industrial legislation” generated a host of statutory measures that
amounted to what Majone describes in the European context as
social regulation rather than social welfare.83 While the response to
industrialism produced a national police power through the creative
exercise of commerce, taxing, spending, and postal powers, the
provision of public goods and public services highlights the changes
that took place in American governance.

78. See William J. Novak, The Legal Transformation of Citizenship in
Nineteenth-Century America, in THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT: NEW DIRECTIONS
IN AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY (Meg Jacobs et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter
Novak, Legal Transformation of Citizenship].
79. Novak, Myth of the “Weak” American State, supra note 76, at 767.
80. Novak, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE, supra note 77, at 21.
81. Id. (including “regulation of dangerous buildings; railways and public
conveyances; corporations; the use of streets, highways, wharves and docks . . . .”).
82. Id. at 23. The U.S. term “affected with a public interest” should be familiar
to Europeans in terms of “service publique.”
83. Giandomenico Majone, The European Community Between Social Policy
and Social Regulation, 31 J. COM. MKT. STUD. 153, 156 (1993).
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Novak also argues that there was a further “constitutionalization of
rights” in the United States, but this was not uniform and universal in
much the same way that European legal jurisprudence initially
focused on market citizenship, social rights, boundaries, and benefits
for European citizens.84 American citizenship in the nineteenth
century was also based on a hierarchy of rights.85 Sharp restrictions
were imposed by gender, race, and ethnicity in terms of mobility,
freedom, and property rights. Like EU citizenship that was only
formalized in the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, American citizenship as
a concept was not central to constitutional debates; instead it was
applied as a jurisdictional, rather than a rights issue.86 States were
thus able to discriminate against non-residents in numerous ways,
such as in debtor-creditor relations, marketing, or corporate
privileges.87 As Novak concludes, in the nineteenth century,
“[i]ndividual rights and obligations remained the products of local
governments and courts elaborating highly differentiated commonlaw rules of status, membership and association.”88 The sudden
emergence of citizenship as an issue came after the Civil War driven
by the Fourteenth Amendment. The conflict about who was a citizen
of the United States brought to the forefront the right of free blacks
and the application of the privileges and immunities clause of
Fourteenth Amendment, which generated broad debates about rights
84. Compare Novak, Legal Transformation of Citizenship, supra note 78, at 94
(arguing that the Bill of Rights did not begin as a “top-down constitutional
enumeration of the rights and responsibilities of citizens of a new nation-state, but
with a bottom-up common law tradition in which citizenship was considered the
last form of membership in a continuum of public jurisdictions and civil
associations”), with Maurizio Ferrara THE BOUNDARIES OF WELFARE: EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION AND THE NEW SPATIAL POLITICS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION 167 (2005)
(discussing obstacles to social protection in Europe, and noting that “federalism
delayed welfare state formation in the North American context, in both Canada and
the USA”).
85. Novak, Legal Transformation of Citizenship, supra note 78, at 95.
86. Id. at 97 (describing the early concept of citizenship as based on
membership to particular groups rather than an individual right).
87. See, e.g., Charles W. McCurdy, American Law and the Marketing Structure
of the Large Corporation, 1875–1890, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 631, 641 (1978)
(describing efforts by commercial enterprises to overcome interstate barriers in
response to changing structure and operation of business enterprises, as out-ofstate manufactures could not sell directly to non-wholesalers within the state, and
out-of-state salesmen had to pay licensing fees to the state for the privilege of
conducting business).
88. Novak, Legal Transformation of Citizenship, supra note 78, at 92.
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in the post-Civil War period.89 The federal government would come
to guarantee those rights based around the concept of national
citizenship. Though expanded to include previously marginalized
groups, debates continued into the twentieth century through the civil
rights and other social movements, as rights became the purview of
national jurisdictions at the expense of local and state authority. This
is something that we should not be surprised to see in the European
context, as the effects of integration bring to the forefront the impact
of differentiated treatment of citizens, non-residents, and the strains
between boundaries, citizenship, and non-discrimination.90
Taken together, these developments bear a strong resemblance to
the legal developments in Europe. Initially, the preliminary review
process did not bestow significant power upon judges. The ECJ was
limited to reviewing issues related to EU law and so Member States
saw it as a body to safeguard EU law rather than an institution
actively involved in European integration. The ECJ also had few
cases to consider in the early period, from around a dozen cases per
year on average during the 1960s to more than two hundred cases per
year since the early 1990s.91 While the ECJ provided an opportunity
for private litigants to “forum shop,” whether litigants were able to
achieve more favorable outcomes depended on rules of access,
acceptance of referral, and other factors. In the United States,
businesses were eager to move their disputes to federal courts. This
was due to the emergence of separate federal and state legal systems
to deal with local affairs, resulting in difficulties for those operating
interstate businesses, so they sought “sympathetic courthouses”
amidst a multiplicity of rules and institutional fragmentation in the
search for order.92 Above all, courts contributed to the process of
market building where a “well-regulated society”93 emerged in which
89. See Philip Hamburger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 61,
74–83 (2011) (explaining that the initial debates on privileges and immunities
centered around mobility, comity and cross-border travel, and later focused on to
whom those rights extended).
90. See Ferrara, supra note 84, at 167.
91. COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, STATISTICS CONCERNING
THE JUDICIAL ACTIVITY OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE 115–16 (2012), available
at
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2012-06/ra2011_
statistiques_cour_en.pdf.
92. Gillman, supra note 34, at 519.
93. Novak, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE, supra note 77, at 21.
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there was an expansion of police and regulatory power in the United
States that corresponds to the rise of the regulatory state in Europe.
In both cases, law was a forceful source of expansive public
authority and governance, as it simultaneously dealt with market
externalities, promotion of public services, and private rights. This
reflects the socially embedded nature of capitalism, and the
important role of the public interest in the construction and
regulation of the market. The developments in Europe and the United
States were overwhelmingly legal in nature, as the promotion of
market integration in labor, consumption and commerce, expansion
of new economic and social rights (for some), and the contestation
for power between competing political-economic jurisdictions was
anything but settled.

IV. NEW WINE IN OLD BOTTLES
Of particular interest in this special issue are the varied sources of
ideas and pressures for change, both internal and external, to the
judicial and legal system. In both the European and American case,
we see that law can be innovative with major changes fostering a
“rights consciousness” that can generate substantial litigation for
addressing economic discrimination, social protection, and
democracy promotion. On the one hand, law can foster doctrinal
changes and legal remedies to deal with the increasing complexity of
society. Then again, law is neither fixed nor immutable, but rather,
part of a broader system of governance, which is flexible in terms of
its jurisdictional authority and scope.
While Rasmussen provides a more nuanced view of the role of law
in fostering and strengthening European integration through detailed
historical analysis, the legal practices observed are unsurprising in a
federal-type system. While pointing to the challenges from deepseated national legal traditions to the creation of a European legal
order, the important question is whether these structural constraints
identified by legal historians are unique to the European Union. In
many federal systems, each level of government has a
“constitutionally grounded claim to some degree of organizational
autonomy and jurisdictional authority”94 that is a product of a
94. Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Role of the Judiciary,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 142 (Keith E. Whittington et al.
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constitutional bargain.95 While central courts seek to promote legal
uniformity within the federation, the degree to which they can ensure
uniformity varies as well.96
Despite the inclusion of constituent units to administer,
implement, and transpose federal policies into constituent state laws,
the preliminary ruling system in Europe does not guarantee
uniformity of judicial norms and practices. For example, the
presumption of constitutionality is interpreted in different ways:
some constitutions, without formally adopting the claim, incorporate
the supremacy claim of European law, and others provide supremacy
to their own constitutional claims over that of European law.97 Even
in the United States, there are conflicting interpretations of federal
law among circuit courts, as well as a history of state resistance to
the Supreme Court in the early foundational period of the American
republic. Though many scholars point to the Marbury v. Madison
ruling as the expression of judicial authority, the Court repudiated it
shortly afterwards in Stuart v. Laird.98 In this instance, the Supreme
Court refused to undermine Congressional authority.99 We might
conclude that courts were fully aware of the potential consequences
of acting out of step with majoritarian institutions, thus they may
refrain from expansive interpretations of judicial review.
While providing an important corrective, the history of European
eds., 2008).
95. Id.
96. Daniel Halberstam & Mathaias Reimann, Federalism and Legal
Unifications: Comparing Methods, Results, and Explanations Across 20 Systems
11–12 (Univ. Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series,
Paper No. 186, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1557690 (outlining
various mechanisms which courts employ to attempt uniformity).
97. Miguel Poiares Maduro, Three Claims of Constitutional Pluralism 12–13,
available at http://www.wzb.eu/sites/default/files/u32/miguel_maduro_three_
claims_of_constitutional_pluralism_hu-coll_may_15_2012.pdf (last visited Mar.
19, 2013).
98. See Daniel Halberstam, Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Marbury and
Van Gend 3 (Univ. Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper
Series, Paper No. 104, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1103253
[hereinafter Halberstam, Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Marbury] (noting that
Chief Justice Marshall polled fellow judges before the Stuart case and did not find
enough support, resulting in a judgment in which he sought a recusal, leading the
Court to uphold the constitutionality of the repeal of the Judiciary Act, thus
acknowledging the political reality that Federalist circuit judges could be purged).
99. Id.
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law needs to be linked to broader comparative studies of federalism
where constitutional orders have been constructed and
transformed.100 The legitimating strategy promoted by the ECJ, along
with support from the legal academy, is neither unique nor unusual,
despite the efforts of legal historians to revise the conventional
understanding of the narrative in Europe. There is a continuing
debate about the appropriate role of courts in the American
constitutional order.101 Here we see clearly some parallels with
European debates. American constitutional history has produced a
strong narrative about the rule of law and constitutionalism that
parallels the deeply ingrained narrative of the ECJ and its role in the
integration process. According to Novak, progressive historians in
raising concerns about compliance with judicial decisions have
“focus[ed] on three great constitutional moments (1787, 1868, and
1937) . . . [resulting in the origins] of constitutional review, the
content of constitutional rights, and Lochnerism and its New Deal
repudiation”102 to explain the constitutional limitations that hindered
the expansive welfare state regimes prevalent in European states.
These critical junctures show how law suppressed labor rights,
promoted liberty of contract, and curbed state and local government
spending and tax power until the New Deal era.103
Consequently, this predominantly “negative legalism”104 views
law as undermining social democracy, providing a constitutional
barrier to the development of a modern regulatory and administrative

100. THE FEDERAL VISION, supra note 5; Halberstam, Constitutionalism and
Pluralism in Marbury, supra note 98.
101. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 59 (1998)
(arguing that “[l]awyers and judges must resist the temptation to make the
Supreme Court the alpha as well as the omega . . . [t]he basic unit of analysis
should be the constitutional regime, the matrix of institutional relationships and
fundamental values that are usually taken as the constitutional baseline in normal
political life”); see also KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 1 (1999)
(“After a long period of almost exclusive concern with the normative questions of
judicial review, constitutional scholars are beginning to recognize the importance
of nonjudicial actors for construing constitutional meaning.”).
102. Novak, Legal Origins, supra note 52, at 258.
103. See id. at 258–59 (providing the observations of constitutional scholars to
support the premise that the law has often been an obstacle to social welfare
reforms).
104. Id. at 251.
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welfare state, in similar ways to those who perceive the
constitutional asymmetry in the European Union as undermining
social rights and welfare.105 In the United States this is often viewed
as “residuum of a nineteenth-century jurisprudential tradition of
natural law and individual rights out-of-step with the needs of a
modern economy.”106 In Europe, the path to market integration also
faces legal and constitutional irregularities where selective
Europeanization results in eviscerating social programs, since
European law “would take precedence over all rules and practices
based on national law . . . all employment and welfare-state polices
at the national level had to be designed in the shadow of
‘constitutionalized’ European law.”107 Thus, “the governance
challenge within Europe remains the resolution of conflict within the
Internal Market” along with the need to address its regulatory and
redistributive problems.108
Rather than see a jurisprudential tradition as hostile to rights and
redistribution, a more positive (as opposed to negative) role of law in
the construction of a central regulatory welfare state has emerged
that challenges the progressive historiography in the United States.109
Rather than a critique of law, this approach views markets as socially
embedded through the expansion of state and federal police power to
deal with social dislocation, modernization, and industrialization,
with law playing a much more socio-progressive role in economic
policymaking.110 Such “embedded liberalism” is also viewed as
emerging through judicial intervention in Europe where the ECJ has
105. See, e.g., Scharpf, supra note 25, at 645 (“National welfare states are
legally and economically constrained by European rules of economic integration,
liberalization, and competition law . . . .”).
106. Novak, Legal Origins, supra note 52, at 252–53.
107. Scharpf, supra note 25, at 646–47. EU law is radically circumscribing state
sovereignty, even in areas such as taxation and health care where it has no
competence, but promotes the fundamental freedoms and removal of interstate
trade restrictions in an expansive manner. See Case C-372/04, Watts v. Bedford
Primary Care Trust, 2006 E.C.R. I-4325 (interpreting Article 49 EC to provide
broad access for medical services for members of other European states); Case C446/03, Marks & Spencer v. Hasley, 2005 E.C.R. I-10866.
108. Michelle Everson, Adjudicating the Market, 8 EUR. L. J. 152, 152 (2002).
109. See, e.g., McCurdy, supra note 87, at 647 (providing an example in which
the Supreme Court was ahead of Congress in nurturing consumer protection by
enabling federal inspection of meat products).
110. Novak, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE, supra note 77, at 21.
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shown a willingness to promote social rights, using market freedoms
and fundamental rights to promote access to collective goods for
European nationals, whether in terms of professions, education,
justice, or national systems of social protection.111 As such, there are
some important parallels between their respective political
developments in terms of the politics of rights.
Equally important, legal historians have focused attention on the
personal preferences and professional ethos surrounding the
constitutionalization of European law.112 While identifying key actors
and organizations that contributed to the development of the
European system, such strategic legal mobilization is not unique to
the European case. Legal historian Harry Scheiber notes, “Since the
Progressive era, some ninety years ago, the leadership of the
organized bar and the judiciary have pursued the agenda of what is
called ‘judicial reform’—with the support of various political
leaders, legal academics and scholars in the field of court
administration, and reform groups dedicated to upgrading
governmental institutions.”113 As Charles McCurdy has argued in his
influential work on nineteenth century commercial practices,
“skillful counsel” within large corporations took action against
restrictive state laws and pushed for new juridical principles to
preserve free trade among the states.114 In challenging the legitimacy
of protectionist state legislation, litigants with sufficient resources
advanced lawsuits to combat state governments’ efforts to mobilize
“counterthrusts” against the Supreme Court’s nationalistic doctrines,
115
in arguments that bear a strong resemblance to judicial scholars
focusing on the strategic mobilization of specific legal constituencies

111. See Case C-127/08, Metock v. Minister for Justice, Equa. & Law Reform,
2008 E.C.R., available at eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
CELEX:62008CJ0127:EN:HTML (exploring the right to move freely between
Member States of the EU); see also Case C-76/05, Schwarz v. Gootjes-Schwarz,
2007 E.C.R. I-6879 (prohibiting the refusal of a Member State to accept an
education tax benefit on the basis of the location of the private school in another
Member State).
112. See, e.g., Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice, supra note 1.
113. Harry Scheiber, Innovation, Resistance, and Change: A History of Judicial
Reform and the California Courts, 1960–1990, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2049, 2071
(1993).
114. McCurdy, supra note 87, at 648.
115. See id. at 641.
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in the European Community context.116
In addition, the role of policy preferences on judicial outcomes has
been widely recognized in studies of the U.S. Supreme Court.117
Much of this behavioral research focused on how the justices’
attitudes and values shaped their votes on a case, since the Supreme
Court’s institutional features of lifetime tenure, dissenting opinions,
and coalition building, shape their ability to vote their policy
preferences.118 Such an argument is now emerging in legal history
research on the role of European judges in terms of how individual
preferences shape court behavior and outcomes.119 Further research
on voting patterns in the ECJ could contribute significantly to an
understanding of the role of attitudinal factors in forecasting judicial
outcomes based on aggregating the preferences of judges.
However, legal historians have also pointed to the institutional
constraints imposed by other political actors, including national
governments, courts, and administrators, in shaping the development
of the European legal system.120 This suggests that judges take
account of the constraints they may encounter and understand the
consequences of their own action in introducing their policy
preferences into law.121 These constraints can take the form of formal
116. See, e.g., Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice, supra note 1.
117. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 40, at 4 (“The authoritative character of
judicial decisions results because judges make policy. Policy making involves
choosing among alternative courses of action, where the choice binds the behavior
of those subject to the policy-maker’s action.”).
118. Forrest Maltzman et al., Strategy and Judicial Choice: New Institutionalist
Approached to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING, supra note 52, at 43 [hereinafter Maltzman et al., Strategy and Judicial
Choice].
119. See Clifford J. Carrubba et al., Judicial Behavior Under Political
Constraints: Evidence from the European Court of Justice, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
435, 449 (2008) (using quantitative analysis to show how political constraints
affect judicial decision-making; specifically, the threat of non-compliance and
legislative override induce courts to amend decisions, and the preferences of
Member States exert powerful influences on the jurisprudence of the Court). This
is similar to the exogenous constraints approach, widely known as the separationof-powers model, in the United States.
120. See Davies & Rasmussen, supra note 42, at 316.
121. See Maltzman et al., Strategy and Judicial Choice, supra note 118, at 51
(describing the role of policy preferences and institutional constraints in shaping
Court outcomes and noting the strategic behavior of judges is shaped by
preferences and actions of other actors outside the Court, as well as the action
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rules or informal norms, where internal rules of procedure about the
use of judicial panels, assignment of Advocates General to specific
cases, assignment of specific opinions to judges, as well as norms of
consensus and use of precedent can impact judicial behavior. As
such, the story told by legal historians about the strategic interactions
between the judicial, executive, and administrative branches at the
national and European level are not dissimilar to the exogenous and
endogenous constraints emerging from the American federal court
system. Yet we know remarkably less about the strategic behavior of
justices—at the national and European levels—within existing
institutional constraints.122 It is possible that the discursive practices,
legal reasoning, and legal remedies to accommodate the justices’
respective legal claims to supremacy are aimed at avoiding frequent
and divisive constitutional conflicts.123 The well-known example of
the fundamental rights jurisprudence of the ECJ illustrates its ability
to acknowledge the importance of human rights practices in national
constitutions.124
By focusing on political processes in which legal decisions are
made rather than on final case law opinions, the new legal history
highlights the importance of coalition formation and opinion-writing
on the Court as key explanations for emergence of constitutional
practices and legal precedents in the European Union. As a result,
legal historians are developing a much richer understanding of the
political, strategic nature of judicial decision-making in the formative
period of integration.125 But judicial review and the norms of direct
effect and supremacy that derived from such legal reasoning are not
formal provisions established by conscious institutional design and
treaty bargains. They are the product of political willingness to

taken by other judges. Justices engage in strategic behavior that can be used to
model judicial behavior and outcomes, allowing for changing preferences in the
course of decision-making, from opinion writing through joining the majority).
122. But see Carrubba, supra note 119, at 449.
123. See Burley & Mattli, supra note 35, at 41–42 (noting the importance of
doctrinal discourse that allows legal reasoning to “mask” the implications of its
rulings, affording it strong protection against national governments’ opposition).
124. See Weiler & Lockhart, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 11, at 61
(noting Rutili, Cinéthèque, and Klensch as landmark decisions of the ECJ applying
its fundamental rights jurisprudence to national constitutions).
125. See, e.g., Boerger-de Smedt, supra note 19 (discussing early negotiations in
treaties).

2013]

TOWARD A NEW HISTORY IN EUROPEAN LAW

1251

accept such norms. Legal historians have sought to explain what
caused the commitment to reviewing the constitutionality of both
European and national statutes by courts through archival research.
However, we might theorize about the broader implications of such
inter-institutional politics by using a framework drawn from rational
choice to understand the political and strategic preferences of
different actors, the political context in which the dispute takes place,
and the strategic behavior of jurists.126
Equally important are the implications of vesting federal
supremacy through judicial mechanisms, rather than legislative
processes, meaning that the European Community chose to deal with
the inevitable friction between levels of government in a federal
system in much the same way as the Americans in their founding
document. Choosing judicial supremacy has resulted in resistance.127
In highlighting concerns about compliance with judicial decisions,
scholars have raised an issue of both empirical and theoretical
importance. Compliance with laws, treaties, and statutes is critical
for democracy, yet it has often been assumed that adherence to
judicial decisions and rulings are routine in advanced industrial
democracies. When judicial rulings call on multiple governments to
act, they may do so to different degrees and understandings. This
complex issue of compliance, supremacy, independence, and power
in relation to courts also suggests that understanding what drove
legal integration in Europe can generate multiple causation and
inferential challenges. Ideas about what factors influenced European
legal developments may be helped by counterfactuals in testing new
historical arguments: What if European Member States had reversed
court rulings, either through treaty amendment or legislative action?
How different would the Community look if they had taken the
Madison path and opted for broad legislative oversight and negative
vetoes over state legislation by a federal legislature or
126. For a strategic model in the context of constitutional cases, see Jack Knight
& Lee Epstein, On the Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, 30 L. & SOC’Y REV. 87,
92 (1996); Robert Lowry Clinton, Game Theory, Legal History, and the Origins of
Judicial Review: A Revisionist Analysis of Marbury v. Madison, 38 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 285 (1994).
127. Alison L. LaCroix, What if Madison Had Won? Imagining a Constitutional
World of Legislative Supremacy, 45 IND. L. REV. 41, 41–42 (2012) (discussing the
decision of the founders of which branch would have supremacy, and noting that
Madison argued for the legislature over the judiciary).
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government?128 Would there have been more resistance to the
supremacy doctrine? What might be the implications if supremacy
was vested in other institutions rather than the Court?

V. CONCLUSION
Bridging the disparate approaches to the study of European law is
difficult given different theoretical and empirical orientations in
European integration. While legal historians have pointed to the
contradictory efforts of promotion and resistance to European
constitutionalism within Member States, they have offered more
nuanced understandings of key legal opinions. In so doing, they open
up new avenues for research that can provide a richer historical
context about the strategic nature of European- and national-level
judicial policy-making. Building upon this research, we can further
theorize about the agenda-setting role of specific national courts, the
dynamic political process in which legal decisions are made, and the
changing of preferences in the course of legal decision-making based
on more detailed empirical data. Though initially conceived of as an
international organization, the ECJ is like a federal court, which
brings possibilities of further comparisons with other federal
systems.129 While one recent direction has been to focus on the ECJ
in terms of judicial emulation and diffusion to other regional
courts,130 the other direction is to think about the historical parallels
where the intersection of national law with federal constitutional law
in Europe can generate comparisons with the American experience
where local common law was displaced by federal constitutional law
in the post-Civil War period with corresponding legal mobilization
and resistance, and concerns about the balance between enumerated
rights, state autonomy, and constitutional tolerance.131 In the United
States, the role of law contributed to the growth of the modern
128. See, e.g., id. (explaining that the founders rejected Madison’s request for a
Council that would review all state laws before adoption).
129. See, e.g., Mauro Cappelletti, supra note 21.
130. See Alter & Helfer, supra note 37, at 563 (arguing “that international
judges are more likely to become expansionist lawmakers where they are
supported by sub-state interlocutors and compliance constituencies, including
government officials, advocacy networks, national judges, and administrative
agencies”).
131. Novak, Legal Transformation of Citizenship, supra note 78, at 94; EGAN,
SINGLE MARKETS, supra note 6.
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regulatory state and the growth of constitutional individual rights that
are among the most important changes in American governance in
the nineteenth century.
Interestingly, what emerged was a “veritable cult of
constitutionalism” in the late nineteenth century, where a variety of
local and state laws came under the purview of the U.S. Supreme
Court, which defined the boundaries between public and private as
well as state and federal power.132 Miguel Poiares Maduro has
pointed to a similar development in the ECJ.133 Rasmussen has
sought to challenge the classical historical narrative of a progressive
process of “constitutionalization” in ways that are reminiscent of
American legal historians who challenge the dominant paradigm
widely accepted by progressive constitutional historiography and
critical legal studies that the expansion of individual rights and
governmental power that characterized the modern liberal state is a
New Deal phenomenon. Constitutional practices were as unsettled in
nineteenth and twentieth century America as they were in post-war
Europe. Constitutional doctrines and statutory practices emerged to
deal with the changes in production and consumption and rights and
citizenship throughout the nineteenth century.134 What emerges from
this comparison is the creative and constitutive role of law in
balancing market liberalism and social welfare, individual rights
against collective public goods, and promoting national and
international commerce through regulating the conditions for
economic growth, competitiveness, and development.135
Together the changes made by law contributed to a tremendous
restructuring of American and European political economies and
democratic governance—arguably significant transformations that
deserve consideration in their own right. American law responded to
the changes of industrialism by expanding rights through a paradigm
of national citizenship, along with democratic legal control over
markets. Though by no means mitigating conflict or fully
recognizing individual identities, many difficult constitutional
questions confronted the U.S. Supreme Court as it sought to exercise
132. Novak, Legal Origins, supra note 52, at 267–68.
133. See generally MADURO, WE THE COURT, supra note 10.
134. See, e.g., Novak, Legal Transformation of Citizenship, supra note 78, at 85.
135. See Egan, Single Market, supra note 25, at 410–12; EGAN, SINGLE
MARKETS, supra note 6; see also MONTI, supra note 29.
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its jurisprudence. As Europe continues to be in turmoil with
considerable protest about the integration project, legal historians are
contributing to the debate about democratic legitimacy by studying
the framework in which such Court-expansionist cases were decided.
In doing so, they are implicitly raising questions about the countermajoritarian tendencies of the European Union and the relationship
of law to the empirical and normative development of political
union. Rasmussen suggests that “we need a very broad understanding
of the actors and societal forces that shaped the development of
European public law.”136 Legal historians are shedding light on the
early development of the ECJ, adding their own intellectual and
methodological contributions to our understanding of courts and
politics, leading us to ask how their historical contextualization
changes the way we understand legal decision-making and legal
change.
Although acknowledging their contributions, my aim has been to
utilize the insights of American Political Development (“APD”) so
that the ongoing reassessment of the role of law in both federal
systems suggests new understandings and directions for research for
scholars of European integration. American political development is
distinguished by its engagement with the past through empirical
rigor, its challenge to path dependency, through systematic
consideration of temporality, and its emphasis on conceptualizing
historical processes of change. APD scholarship has contributed to a
broader understanding of judicial activism that challenges the
behavioral approach to judicial policy-making as well as the more
normative work on justice and the law.137 To some degree, EU legal
historians are going down the same path. Though the substantive
focus of APD is on the American system, it is contributing to the
historical turn in political science by “unraveling the teleological
assumptions” of earlier studies and reexamining traditional themes.138
APD scholarship stresses institutional change that may be
endogenously generated by frictions and “incurrence” between
multiple political orders and traditions, or exogenously driven by
136. Rasmussen, supra note 42.
137. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
138. KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT xi, 123 (2004) (defining APD in terms of “durable shift
in governing authority”).
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their interaction with other institutions.139
As such, APD scholars have shown that the American judiciary
has played a strong role in the creation of a national economy,
advancing certain individual rights at the expense of others, and
constituting national citizenship.140 Not only does the
institutionalization of specific legal practices occur, but it also
provokes contestation and change. Equally relevant, APD scholars
have focused on the structural weakness of other institutions—
namely legislative and executive—to understand why other actors
and institutions assert or assent to such legal activism.141 This
accords with Weiler’s seminal argument that portrays “integration
through law” as a rational response to a changing political
environment.142 Arguably, legal historians need to explore the
consequences of legal changes for state development, authority, and
power, and they need to elaborate upon how jurisprudence and the
interplay of ideas, institutions, and ideological agendas generate
different political logics that can result in contradictions and
dysfunctional outcomes. This will enable legal historians to broaden
their paradigmatic and substantive questions to engage not only the
fields of European integration specifically, but international law,
international relations, and comparative politics more broadly.143

139. Id.
140. Novak, Legal Transformation of Citizenship, supra note 78; BENSEL, supra
note 68.
141. WHITTINGTON, supra note 53.
142. Weiler, supra note 2.
143. Mark A. Pollack, The New EU Legal History: What's New, What's
Missing?, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1257 (2013).

